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Advances in Dynamic Game Theory: Numerical Methods, Algorithms, and Applications in Ecology and Economics

Steffen Jørgensen, Marc Quincampoix, and Thomas L. Vincent, editors
Publication Date: 
Number of Pages: 
Annals of the International Society of Dynamic Games
We do not plan to review this book.



Part I. Dynamic Game Theory

P. Cardaliaguet, M. Quincampoix, and P. Saint-Pierre: Differential Games Through Viability Theory: Old and Recent Results

A. Chikrii, I. Matychyn, and K. Chikrii: Differential Games with Impulse Control

P. Cardaliaguet: On the Instability of the Feedback Equilibrium Payoff in a Nonzero-Sum Differential Game on the Line

S.A. Ganeby, S.S. Kumkov, V.S. Patsko, and S.G. Pyatko: Constructing Robust Control in Differential Games: Application to Aircraft Control During Landing

J. Beck and J.A. Filar: Games, Incompetence, and Training

M. Margiocco and L. Pusillo: Stackelberg Well-Posedness and Hierarchical Potential Games

Part II. Stochastic Differential Games

O. Alvarez and M. Bardi: Ergodic Problems in Differential Games

D.W.K. Yeung, L. Petrosyan, and P.M. Yeung: Subgame Consistent Solutions for a Class of Cooperative Stochastic Differential Games with Nontransferable Payoffs

Part III. Pursuit-Evasion Games

A. Melikyan: Geometry of Pursuit-Evasion Games on Two-Dimensional Manifolds

J. Shinar, V.Y. Glizer, and V. Turetsky: Solution of a Linear Pursuit-Evasion Game with Variable Structure and Uncertain Dynamics

E. Crück, M. Quincampoix, and P. Saint-Pierre: Pursuit-Evasion Games with Impulsive Dynamics

I. Shevchenko: Approaching Coalitions of Evaders on the Average

Part IV. Evolutionary Game Theory and Applications

J. Garay: Adaptive Dynamics Based on Ecological Stability

W.A. Mitchell: Adaptive Dynamics, Resource Conversion Efficiency and Species Diversity

T.L.S. Vincent and T.L. Vincent: Evolutionarily Stable Relative Abundance Distributions

F. Hamelin, P. Bernhard, P. Nain, and E. Wajnberg: Foraging under Competition: Evolutionarily Stable Patch-Leaving Strategies with Random Arrival Times. 1. Scramble Competition

F. Hamelin, P. Bernhard, A.J. Shaiju, and E. Wajnberg: Foraging under Competition: Evolutionarily Stable Patch-Leaving Strategies with Random Arrival Times. 2. Interference Competition

R.C. Rael, T.L. Vincent, R.F. Costantino, and J.M. Cushing: Evolution of Corn Oil Sensitivity in the Flour Beetle

C.J. Whelan, J.S. Brown, and J. Moll: The Evolution of Gut Modulation and Diet Specialization as a Consumer-Resource Game

Part V. Applications of Dynamic Games to Economics

R. Beard and S. McDonald: Time-Consistent Fair Water Sharing Agreements

T. Alpcan and T. Basar: A Hybrid Noncooperative Game Model for Wireless Communications

H. Shen and T. Basar: Incentive-Based Pricing for Network Games with Complete and Incomplete Information

D.A. Behrens, J.P. Caulkins, G. Feichtinger, and G. Tragler: Incentive Stackelberg Strategies for a Dynamic Game on Terrorism

R. Cellini and L. Lambertini: Capital Accumulation, Mergers, and the Ramsey Golden Rule

S. Luckraz: Economic Growth and Process Spillovers with Step-by-Step Innovation

B. Kim and F. El Ouardighi:  Supplier-Manufacturer Collaboration on New Product Development

O. Rubel and G. Zaccour: A Differential Game of a Dual Distribution Channel

S. Jørgensen and A. Di Liddo: Design Imitation in the Fashion Industry

T.L. Friesz, R. Mookherjee, and M.A. Rigdon: Formulating and Solving Service Network Pricing and Resource Allocation Games as Differential Variational Inequalities

Part VI. Numerical Methods and Algorithms in Dynamic Games

H.J. Kushner: Numerical Methods for Stochastic Differential Games: The Ergodic Cost Criterion

W.J. Grantham: Gradient Transformation Trajectory Following Algorithms for Determining Stationary Min-Max Saddle Points

D.B. McDonald and W.J. Grantham: Singular Perturbation Trajectory Following Algorithms for Min-Max Differential Games

S. Le Ménec: Min-Max Guidance Law Integration

M.N. Szilagyi: Agent-Based Simulation of the N-Person Chicken Game

O. Mikaelyan and R. Khachaturyan: The Optimal Trajectory in the Partial-Cooperative Game