You are here

Game Theoretic Problems in Network Economics and Mechanism Design Solutions

Y. Narahari, Dinesh Garg, Ramasuri Narayanam, and Hastagiri Prakash
Publication Date: 
Number of Pages: 
Advanced Information and Knowledge Processing
We do not plan to review this book.
  • Introduction
  1. Motivating Problems in Network Economics

  2. Mechanism Design

  3. Outline of the Monograph

  • Foundations of Mechanism Design

  1. Strategic Form Games

  2. Dominant Strategy Equilibria

  3. Pure Strategy Nash Equilibrium

  4. Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibrium

  5. Bayesian Games

  6. The Mechanism Design Environment

  7. Examples of Social Choice Functions

  8. Implementation of Social Choice Functions

  9. Incentive Compatibility and the Revelation Theorem

  10. Properties of Social Choice Functions

  11. The Gibbard Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem

  12. Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

  13. The Quasi Linear Environment

  14. Groves Mechanisms

  15. Clarke (Pivotal) Mechanisms

  16. Examples of VCG Mechanisms

  17. Bayesian Implementation: The dAGVA Mechanism

  18. Bayesian Incentive Compatibility in Linear Environment

  19. Revenue Equivalence Theorem

  20. Myerson Optimal Auction

  21. Further Topics in Mechanism Design

  22. To Probe Further

  • Mechanism Design for Sponsored Search Auctions

  1. Internet Advertising

  2. Sponsored Search Auction

  3. Sponsored Search Auction as a Mechanism Design Problem

  4. Generalized First Price (GFP) Mechanism

  5. Generalized Second Price (GSP) Mechanism

  6. Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Mechanism

  7. Optimal (OPT) Mechanism

  8. Comparison of GSP, VCG, and OPT Mechanisms

  9. Individual Rationality

  10. Computational Complexity

  11. Summary and Future Work

  12. Related Literature

  • Mechanism Design for Resource Procurement in Grid Computing

  1. Grid Computing

  2. The Model

  3. The G-DSIC Mechanism

  4. The G-BIC Mechanism

  5. G-OPT: An Optimal Auction Mechanism

  6. Current Art and Future Perspective

  • Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocols for Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes

  1. Introduction to Ad hoc Wireless Networks

  2. Ad hoc Networks with Selfish Nodes

  3. Relevant Work on Incentive Compatible Protocols

  4. A Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible Broadcast Protocol

  5. A Bayesian Incentive Compatible Broadcast (BIC-B) Protocol

  6. DSIC-B Protocol versus BIC-B Protocol: A Discussion

  7. Conclusions and Future Work

  • To Probe Further

  1. Topics in Mechanism Design

  2. Key Application Areas

  3. In Conclusion